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Justice Not for Sale: A Constitutional Defense 
of the Missouri Plan for Judicial Selection 
Cort A. VanOstran
*
 
INTRODUCTION 
Judicial selection for state courts in the United States has become 
a controversial subject in American jurisprudence. In the past several 
decades, a debate has emerged over the proper balance between 
independence and accountability in the judicial selection process. 
Professor Nelson Lund entered this debate by arguing that 
merit-based judicial selection plans—those plans that utilize 
nonpartisan commissions in judicial appointments (and therefore fall 
outside either a traditional appointment or electoral scheme)—violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because of the 
enhanced role attorneys play in the process, resulting in what 
Professor Lund describes as the disenfranchisement of non-attorney 
voters.
1
 Specifically, Professor Lund takes issue with the structural 
provision in many such plans that allows state bar members to elect 
individuals for service on the nonpolitical nominating commission, 
which in turn submits nominees to the state’s governor for final 
selection.
2
 The widely-emulated Missouri Plan is the prime example 
of such a scheme for judicial selection. This Note argues that Lund’s 
 
 
* J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law; A.B. (2011), Harvard University. 
Many thanks to two mentors who influenced my decision to choose law as a profession: my 
uncle, Keith Wilkes, and Ed Hershewe, a great friend and role model. I am also particularly 
grateful to Professors Charles Burson and Karen Tokarz for their guidance, wisdom, and 
support throughout law school. Finally, this Note deals with the merits of the Missouri Plan for 
judicial selection. My positive impressions of the Plan have undoubtedly been shaped by two 
great former Chief Justices of the Missouri Supreme Court: Richard Teitelman and Ronnie 
White. I am grateful to count both as mentors and friends.  
 1. Nelson Lund, May Lawyers Be Given the Power to Elect Those Who Choose Our 
Judges? ‘Merit Selection’ and Constitutional Law, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1043, 1046–47 
(2011). 
 2. Id. 
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criticism is erroneous; rather, merit-based judicial selection plans do 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because they promote, rather 
than discourage, equal participation in democracy. Furthermore, 
merit-based plans fit well within a tradition of non-electoral schemes 
that have been accepted by the United States Supreme Court for 
certain bureaucratic offices. Moreover, efforts to challenge the 
constitutionality of such plans seem driven more by moneyed 
political interests than legitimate constitutional concerns about the 
true will of the electorate.  
In Part I, this Note briefly summarizes the history of judicial 
selection in the United States, including the rise and spread of 
merit-based selection as an attempt to balance the need for both 
independence and accountability in the judiciary. Part I also explores 
Supreme Court jurisprudence as it pertains to judicial selection plans 
like the Missouri Plan. In doing so, it considers Dool v. Burke, a 
Tenth Circuit decision that recently confirmed the constitutionality of 
such merit-based selection plans, and which was recently denied 
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
3
 In Part II, this Note 
considers the application of existing jurisprudence on merit-based 
plans. Finally, Part III argues for the constitutionality of merit-based 
plans based on both their consistence with previously legitimated 
non-electoral processes and their promotion of democratic 
participation. 
I. HISTORY 
The debate over the “best” method for selecting judges is a 
longstanding one
4
 that has roots in “a much more fundamental 
philosophical and political disagreement regarding the role of judges 
in our political system.”5 This brief account addresses the history and 
status of elective, appointive, and merit-based judicial selection plans 
in the United States. It then considers the history of constitutional 
 
 3. Dool v. Burke, 497 F. App’x 782 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 992 (2013). 
 4. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is There One ‘Best’ Method?, 23 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995) (noting “[t]he debate over selection and tenure of judges has 
been ongoing since shortly after the founding of our nation”). 
 5. Id. 
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challenges to merit-based selection plans, and reviews Dool v. 
Burke,
6
 a recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case that ruled on the 
constitutionality of merit-based judicial selection plans. 
A. Judicial Selection in the Early United States 
Appointment of judges can be traced to seventeenth-century 
England, where “the chancellor, acting for the king, appointed judges 
to dispense justice on the king’s behalf.”7 The king continued to 
exercise this power in the American colonies, and this exercise was 
one of the complaints cited by the drafters of the Declaration of 
Independence.
8
 While various states placed limits on the appointment 
power upon gaining independence, and the federal government 
tempered that power by requiring senatorial confirmation for federal 
judges appointed by the president, no state adopted popular election 
of judges for half a century.
9
  
Popular election of judges nonetheless has deep roots in American 
history. Webster writes that “partisan election of judges came into 
vogue as a part of the wave of popular democracy that engulfed the 
nation during the era of Andrew Jackson’s presidency.”10 Despite the 
subsequent rise of merit-based selection plans, popular election of 
judges remains a common method of selection in many states.
11
 In 
large part, the same basic tensions that framed the debate over elected 
 
 6. 497 F. App’x 782 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 992 (2013). 
 7. Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).  
 8. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (“He has made Judges 
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their 
salaries.”).  
 9. Again, Goldschmidt provides a succinct and useful history: 
Eight of the thirteen original states adopted the appointive process, but placed it in the 
hands of one or both houses of the legislature; three states provided for joint 
appointment by the governor and a council; and two states provided for gubernatorial 
appointment subject to confirmation by a council. 
Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 5 (internal citations omitted). 
 10. See Webster, supra note 4, at 16. 
 11. Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Selection Reconsidered: A Plea for Radical 
Moderation, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 623, 626 (2012) (arguing “most people favor judicial 
elections, presumably as a way to guard against judges running amok”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
162 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 44:159 
 
 
versus appointed judges during the time of Jackson still persist 
today.
12
 
There are a number of policy arguments in favor of popular 
election of judges. Certainly, it is the most democratic means of 
controlling the judiciary.
13
 But popular election of judges has also 
come under great fire,
14
 and from a wide variety of sources.
15
 
Goldschmidt, for example, criticizes popular election, arguing, 
“Elections . . . discourage many well-qualified people from seeking 
judicial office . . . . Elections also compromise the independence of 
the judiciary . . . . No less significant are the problems associated 
with judges who must campaign and seek campaign contributions 
and with getting court business accomplished during reelection 
time.”16  
 
 12. Id. at 624 (“[T]he argument against an appointed judiciary and for an elected one 
follows naturally . . . unelected judges are unaccountable policymakers; unaccountable 
policymakers flout the rule of law and the will of the people; therefore, unelected judges flout 
the rule of the law and the will of the people.”). See also Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 431, 431 (2004) (explaining “[a] basic tradeoff exists between independence, 
accountability, and quality. To preserve independence, it is necessary to insulate judges from 
external controls over their behavior. If judges are protected from external controls, however, 
they have fewer incentives to provide quality services.”).  
 13. Webster, supra note 4, at 6 (“[I]f one believes that the process of judging involves 
unbridled discretion—that it is based upon nothing more than the personal or political 
proclivities of each individual judge—direct accountability to the electorate becomes much 
more important, indeed, perhaps paramount.”). 
 14. Maura Anne Schoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent Judiciary: 
An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 839, 839 (1994) 
(“[T]his nation’s ability to put independent, fair, and competent jurists on the benches of our 
courts disappears when the United States permits the popular election of judges. While such 
elective systems enable the people to hold their government employees accountable, the 
resulting product is far removed from the American concepts of justice . . . .”). 
 15. Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 13–14 (“In fact, it is common knowledge that the public 
is uninformed about judicial candidates, and, worse still, some believe that that ethnic name 
recognition is the basis for many voting decisions. Election contests are usually issueless and 
have low voter turnout. Most incumbents are easily reelected and often run unopposed.”). See 
also Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 694 (1995) (“When those charged with checking the majority are 
themselves answerable to, and thus influenced by, the majority, the question arises how 
individual and minority protection is secured.”). 
 16. Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 14. 
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B. The Rise and Role of Merit-Based Selection 
Merit-based selection of judges has a somewhat shorter history, 
arising primarily out of the progressive movement of the early 
1900s.
17
 Merit-based selection emerged as a new attempt to balance 
the competing interests of independence and accountability in the 
judiciary.
18
 Merit selection as it is known today was largely 
formulated in 1914, when Northwestern University Professor Albert 
Kales proposed comprehensive reforms to systems of judicial 
election.
19
 Under the revolutionary Kales Plan, a nonpolitical 
commission would identify and select the most qualified candidates 
for vacant judgeships.
20
 “A popularly-elected chief justice would then 
make an appointment from the list of the commission’s nominees. 
After a specified initial term of office, and for subsequent terms, 
judges would run in an unopposed retention election.”21  
British academic Harold Laski, who proposed that the executive 
be given the appointment power, later modified the Kales Plan,
22
 and 
a New York group further altered the idea by suggesting citizens 
comprise part of the nonpartisan selection committee.
23
 It was in this 
modified form that the Plan was adopted by Missouri voters in 1940 
“for its appellate courts, the circuit and probate courts of St. Louis 
City and Jackson County (Kansas City), and the St. Louis courts of 
 
 17. Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 8. See also Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri 
Non-Partisan Court Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing 
Socio-Legal Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 317 (1997) (“Unfortunately, by the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, the practice of electing judges, while representing a democratic ideal, often 
degraded into the selection of machine sponsored judicial ‘hacks.’”). 
 18. Daugherty, supra note 17, at 317. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 21. In modern merit-selection plans, “[t]he size of 
nominating commissions also varies widely nationwide . . . . The attorney members of 
nominating commissions are either appointed by the governor, or elected or appointed by the 
state or local bars.” Id. at 21–22. 
 21. Id. at 8. See also Andrea McArdle, The Increasingly Fractious Politics of Nonpartisan 
Judicial Selection: Accountability Challenges to Merit-Based Reform, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1799, 
1800 (2012) (“Historically, judicial retention elections rarely garner much attention, as they 
involve no contest or competition between candidates but rather are a procedure in which the 
judicial incumbent competes against herself in terms of her performance on the bench. 
Typically, judges prevail in these low-visibility, low-engagement elections and are returned to 
office.”). 
 22. Goldschmidt, supra note 7, at 9. 
 23. Id. 
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criminal correction.”24 Specifically, under the adopted Plan, a 
commission of seven members (three appointed by the governor, 
three elected by the state bar association, and the sitting chief justice) 
select three candidates for any open judgeship, and those names are 
then submitted to the governor for final selection. Because the Plan 
was first adopted by Missouri, it “has since also come to be known as 
the ‘Missouri Plan.’”25 The Plan still exists in the state today, and is 
largely unchanged.
26
 
Numerous states followed suit by adopting their own versions of 
the Plan,
27
 and many of these states utilized the Missouri Plan 
directly.
28
 A plethora of policy reasons have been proffered in 
 
 24. Id. at 10. 
 25. Id. at 20.  
 26. The relevant provisions of the Missouri Constitution are as follows:  
Whenever a vacancy shall occur in the office of judge of any of the following courts of 
this state, to wit: The supreme court, the court of appeals, or in the office of circuit or 
associate circuit judge within the city of St. Louis and Jackson County, the governor 
shall fill such vacancy by appointing one of three persons possessing the qualifications 
for such office, who shall be nominated and whose names shall be submitted to the 
governor by a nonpartisan judicial commission established and organized as 
hereinafter provided. If the governor fails to appoint any of the nominees within sixty 
days after the list of nominees is submitted, the nonpartisan judicial commission 
making the nomination shall appoint one of the nominees to fill the vacancy. 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a). 
Not less than sixty days prior to the holding of the general election next preceding the 
expiration of his term of office, any judge whose office is subject to the provisions of 
sections 25(a)-(g) may file in the office of the secretary of state a declaration of 
candidacy for election to succeed himself . . . . If such declaration is filed, his name 
shall be submitted at said next general election to the voters eligible to vote within the 
state if his office is that of judge of the supreme court . . . . If a majority of those voting 
on the question vote against retaining him in office, upon the expiration of his term of 
office, a vacancy shall exist which shall be filled by appointment as provided in 
section 25(a); otherwise, said judge shall, unless removed for cause, remain in office 
for the number of years after December thirty-first following such election as is 
provided for the full term of such office, and at the expiration of each such term shall 
be eligible for retention in office by election in the manner here prescribed. 
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(c)(1) [hereinafter Missouri Plan]. 
 27. McArdle, supra note 21, at 1800 (“Embracing the Missouri Plan, as the state’s 
nonpartisan, commission-based method for selecting judges came to be known, thirty-six states 
in addition to the District of Columbia have adopted a form of the judicial nominating 
commission feature and, of these jurisdictions, sixteen also use retention elections.”). 
 28. These states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Wyoming, and, of course, Missouri itself. ST. CTS. 
GUIDE, http://www.statecourtsguide.com (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/13
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support of merit-based selection plans.
29
 While the Plan is widely 
celebrated, it has also been attacked for being “elitist”30 or otherwise 
undemocratic.
31
 These criticisms have almost exclusively focused on 
policy arguments, rather than potential constitutional conflicts. 
C. Merit-Based Selection as a Constitutional Issue 
While the history surrounding nonpartisan, merit-based judicial 
selection is easily elucidated, the jurisprudence surrounding its 
constitutionality is largely undeveloped. At least four federal cases 
have dealt directly with the constitutionality of merit-based selection 
systems: three federal district court cases and one case in the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals.
32
 Each of these cases upheld the 
constitutionality of merit-based judicial selection plans,
33
 but none 
dealt with the constitutional issues currently being raised in cases 
such as the Tenth Circuit’s Dool v. Burke (which, as mentioned 
earlier, centers around the permissibility of the enhanced role of 
lawyers—who are allowed to elect members of the nonpartisan 
nominating commission—in the most common merit-based 
structure). 
 
 29. Daugherty, supra note 17, at 339 (“Advocates stress the Plan’s emphasis on 
professional qualifications rather than political influence, pre-appointment merit screening, little 
need to campaign or raise funds, and promotion of judicial stability.”). 
 30. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 759 
(2009) (“The Missouri Plan gives disproportionate power to the bar in selecting the nominating 
commission, while eliminating the requirement that the governor’s pick be confirmed by the 
senate or similar popularly elected body.”).  
 31. Id. at 765 (“This, of course, is the core of the Missouri Plan—allowing the bar to 
select some of the commission and then declining to offset that bar power with confirmation by 
the senate or other popularly elected body.”). See also Brian Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit 
Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (“In short, I am skeptical that merit selection 
removes politics from judicial selection. Rather, merit selection may simply move the politics of 
judicial selection into closer alignment with the ideological preferences of the bar.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 32. Kirk v. Carpeneti, 623 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2010); Bradley v. Work, 916 F. Supp. 1446 
(S.D. Ind. 1996); African-American Voting Rights Legal Def. Fund v. Missouri, 994 F. Supp. 
1105 (E.D. Mo. 1997); Carlson v. Wiggins, 760 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Iowa 2011) (finding a 
system constitutional in which the governor appoints one of three nominees provided by a 
commission composed of seven members elected by the state bar, seven members appointed by 
the governor, and the state’s senior supreme court justice). 
 33. See supra note 32. 
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Another line of cases, in which a subgroup of the voting 
population challenges a scheme that limits their voting rights, bears 
relevance.
34
 In the landmark case Kramer v. Union Free School 
District No. 15,
35
 the Supreme Court invalidated on Equal Protection 
grounds “a state law under which local school boards were elected 
solely by voters who either (a) owned or leased taxable property 
within the school district or (b) had children who were enrolled in the 
local schools.”36 Professor Lund argues Kramer would also serve to 
disallow merit-based selection plans that grant voting attorneys any 
specialized role in the selection process.
37
 Specifically, merit-based 
selection plans often contain provisions that allow bar members—and 
therefore attorneys—to elect a certain portion of the commission 
responsible for interviewing judicial candidates and submitting 
nominations, from which the state’s governor often chooses his or her 
appointee.
38
 In the Missouri Plan, for example, three members of the 
seven-person panel charged with submitting nominees to the 
governor are attorneys elected by the state bar association.
39
 
According to Professor Lund, this structure improperly enhances the 
role attorneys play in the selection scheme, giving them increased 
(and therefore unconstitutional) power in the selection process over 
regular, non-attorney voters.
40
 In this light, the constitutional viability 
of selection plans seems to hinge on whether these plans fall within 
the purview of Kramer and are therefore invalid, or whether they are 
otherwise exempt from an application of Kramer. 
 
 34. This line of cases stems from Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 
(1969). 
 35. 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 36. Lund, supra note 1, at 1047. 
 37. Id. at 1049. 
 38. The arguably controversial provision is set forth in the Missouri Constitution as 
follows:  
The members of the bar of this state . . . shall elect one of their number to serve as a 
member of said commission, and the governor shall appoint one citizen, not a member 
of the bar, from among the residents of each court of appeals district, to serve as a 
member of said commission . . . .  
MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(d). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Lund, supra note 1, at 1050. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/13
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D. Exceptions to Kramer 
The Kramer principle—further elucidated in Reynolds v. Sims—
suggests that all voters are entitled to participate in the elections that 
affect their daily lives.
41
 The first and only directly relevant 
recognized exception to the Kramer principle is known as the 
Salyer/Ball exception.
42
 The exception is derived from two Supreme 
Court decisions. The former, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin 
Water Storage District, dealt with elections for the board of a 
governmental agricultural unit that received funding solely from 
landowners in a certain region, and limited voting rights to those 
same landowners.
43
 In Salyer, the Court “carved out an exception to 
Reynolds [and, by extension, Kramer] for limited-purpose bodies 
exercising narrow government functions and operating to the burden 
or benefit of one group of constituents more than others.”44 The latter 
case, Ball v. James, applied this same exception to “water and power 
districts in which the administration is financially independent of 
local government and the franchise is restricted to farmers.”45 
Otherwise, “[t]he exception is seldom applied . . . .”46 
Other exceptions to the Kramer rule are more difficult to apply in 
the context of judicial selection plans. In Sailors v. Board of 
Education of County of Kent,
47
 the Supreme Court allowed local 
 
 41. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626–27. 
 42. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 371 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 729–30 (1973). 
 43. Salyer, 410 U.S. at 729–30 (“[I]t is quite understandable that the statutory framework 
for election of directors of the appellee focuses on the land benefitted, rather [than] on the land 
as such. California has not opened the franchise to all residents . . . . We hold, therefore, that the 
popular election requirements enunciated by Reynolds, supra, and succeeding cases are 
inapplicable to elections such as the general election of appellee Water Storage District.”). 
 44. Dool v. Burke, 497 F. App’x 782, 787 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 992 (2013) (O’Brien, J., concurring). 
 45. Id. at 787–88. 
 46. Id. at 787. 
 47. 387 U.S. 105, 108 (1967) (“We find no constitutional reason why state or local 
officers of the nonlegislative character involved here may not be chosen by the governor, by the 
legislature, or by some other appointive means rather than by an election.”). See also id. at 110–
11 (“Viable local governments may need many innovations, numerous combinations of old and 
new devices, [and] great flexibility in municipal arrangements to meet changing urban 
conditions. We see nothing in the Constitution to prevent experimentation. At least as respects 
nonlegislative officers, a State can appoint local officials or elect them or combine the elective 
and appointive systems as was done here.”). 
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school boards to elect the members of county school boards, an 
arguably analogous scheme to merit-based selection plans where 
lawyers take on a somewhat increased role in the nominating process. 
However, in most judicial selection plans, the nominating 
commissions in question are not elected by officeholders but are 
merely attorneys.
48
 Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party
49
 is 
relevant but even less applicable, dealing with legislators appointed 
to fill interim terms.
50
 Finally, in Wells v. Edwards,
51
 “the Supreme 
Court summarily affirmed a district court decision holding that the 
vote-dilution principle of Reynolds [v. Sims, mandating the ‘one 
person, one vote’ principle] was inapplicable to elections to judicial 
office.”52  
There is one other case that limits the applicability of the Kramer 
principle by requiring a threshold inquiry into the application of 
Kramer. In Avery v. Midland County, Texas,
53
 the Supreme Court 
determined the ‘one person, one vote’ ruling in Reynolds v. Sims54 
“applies with equal force to officials of a county government who 
exercise ‘general governmental powers over the entire geographic 
area served by the body.’”55 In Avery, “[c]entral to the Court’s 
holding was the idea that citizens should have a voice in the selection 
of the public officials charged with their well-being.”56  
 
 
48. See Missouri Plan, supra note 26. 
 49. 457 U.S. 1, 14 (1982) (holding valid Puerto Rico’s system for filling commonwealth 
legislative vacancies by an election in which only members of the previous incumbent’s party 
may vote); see also id. at 8 (“The methods by which the people of Puerto Rico and their 
representatives have chosen to structure the Commonwealth’s electoral system are entitled to 
substantial deference.”). 
 50. Id. at 12 (“The Puerto Rico Legislature could reasonably conclude that appointment 
by the previous incumbent’s political party would more fairly reflect the will of the voters than 
appointment by the Governor or some other elected official.”). 
 51. 409 U.S. 1095, 1096–97 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (“Judges are not private 
citizens who are sought out by litigious neighbors to pass upon their disputes. They are state 
officials, vested with state powers and elected (or appointed) to carry out the state government’s 
judicial functions. As such, they most certainly ‘perform governmental functions.’”). 
 52. Lund, supra note 1, at 1058. The precedential value of that decision is minimal, 
however, based on the fact that it merely affirmed the decision of the lower court.  
 53. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
 54. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 55. Dool v. Burke, 497 F. App’x 782, 786 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 992 (2013) (O’Brien, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
 56. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/13
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In short, Avery suggests that not every elective office, merely by 
being elective in nature, requires an application of Kramer. Indeed, 
the Avery principle was fleshed out in Hadley v. Junior College Dist. 
of Metropolitan Kansas City.
57
 “As in Avery [and Hadley], the 
inquiry hinged on whether the elected trustees performed ‘general 
governmental functions,’ with a focus on the scope of the official 
power and its impact on the electorate.”58  
Applying these principles to merit-based selection requires a 
consideration of whether the special role lawyers sometimes play in 
the appointment process is a violation of Kramer. Under Avery and 
Hadley, it would seem that rather than attempt to fit the nominating 
commissions into a Kramer exception, the proper first inquiry is 
whether the nominating commissions even exercise the type of 
general government function that would mandate compliance with 
Kramer at all. 
This constitutional background—what relatively little of it there 
is—sets the stage for the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision regarding a 
direct challenge to the constitutionality of merit-based selection 
plans. 
E. Constitutional Consideration: 2012’s Dool v. Burke 
In 2012, the Tenth Circuit in Dool v. Burke issued a per curiam 
opinion affirming the District Court’s decision to uphold Kansas’s 
merit-based judicial selection plan.
59
 The plan was challenged by a 
 
 57. 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970) (“While the particular offices involved in these cases have 
varied, in each case a constant factor is the decision of the government to have citizens 
participate individually by ballot in the selection of certain people who carry out governmental 
functions.”). The Hadley Court further noted that “[i]f there is any way of determining the 
importance of choosing a particular governmental official, we think the decision of the State to 
select that official by popular vote is a strong enough indication that the choice is an important 
one.” Id. at 55. The Court further writes that in those cases where members of a given body are 
selected through appointment rather than election, “the fact that each official does not 
‘represent’ the same number of people does not deny those people equal protection of the laws 
. . . . And a State may, in certain cases, limit the right to vote to a particular group or class of 
people.” Id. at 58–59. 
 58. Dool, 497 F. App’x at 787 (O’Brien, J., concurring). 
 59. Id. at 782–84 (“Kansas fills appellate court vacancies using a merit-selection system 
under which the governor picks from a shortlist of candidates tendered by a nomination 
commission. The commission is comprised of five attorneys and four non-attorneys. 
Non-attorney members are appointed to the commission by the governor, while attorney 
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group of non-attorney voters alleging disenfranchisement because of 
the enhanced role state bar members played by electing certain 
members of the nonpolitical nominating commission.
60
 It is not 
surprising that of the three impaneled judges, the two in the majority 
arrived at their decision to affirm the merit-based plan based on 
completely differing rationales. This divergence in opinion represents 
more than a mere disagreement on the merits; rather, the difference 
likely stems from the lack of precedent on the constitutionality of 
merit-based selection plans. 
Because the Tenth Circuit did not share its rationale in the per 
curiam opinion, the only glimpse we have into the court’s reasoning 
is found in the concurring and dissenting opinions.
61
 Judge O’Brien 
argued in his concurring opinion that Reynolds does not apply to all 
state elective offices,
62
 noting that deference to the state of Kansas is 
proper in matters of governmental structure.
63
 Specifically, O’Brien 
cited the Avery inquiry, “whether the elected trustees performed 
‘general governmental functions,’ with a focus on the scope of the 
official power and its impact on the electorate.”64 O’Brien expressly 
rejected the Salyer/Ball exception, arguing, “The strict demands of 
[Kramer] cannot reasonably apply to every election unable to be 
wedged in the fact-bound and exceedingly narrow exception 
established in Salyer and Ball.”65 Instead, O’Brien wrote that “one 
person, one vote has boundaries; some elective offices . . . do not 
exercise the type of governmental power” constrained by the Court’s 
ruling in Kramer.
66
 
On the other hand, Judge Matheson, in his concurrence, argued 
that the selection plan should be upheld, but only under the narrow 
 
members are elected by resident attorneys.”). In short, this system serves to give attorneys 
greater impact than non-attorneys in choosing judges. 
 60. Id. at 782. 
 61. Id. 
 62. “[S]imply making an office elective does not trigger the strict demands of Reynolds. 
Those demands apply only when the elective office exercises the kind of general government 
functions described in Avery and its progeny.” Id. at 790 (internal citation omitted). 
 63. Id. at 792 (“In the end, this court must defer to Kansas in decisions relating to the 
structure of its government.”). 
 64. Id. at 787 (internal citation omitted). 
 65. Id. at 788. 
 66. Id. 
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Salyer/Ball exception.
67
 Judge McKay dissented, and would have 
found the merit-selection system “unconstitutional under the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.”68  
II. ANALYSIS 
Judicial selection is a controversial and arguably increasingly 
partisan problem in modern political discourse. Its rancorous and 
partisan undertones have not completely escaped the purview of 
popular analysis.
69
 For example, in Missouri, the namesake for merit-
based selection plans around the nation, voters were asked in 
November of 2012 whether the nominating commission—an 
essential component of the merit-based structure—should be altered 
from the nonpartisan form it has taken since its inception.
70
 The 
ballot issue was initiated and promoted by a small group of activists, 
and some commentators saw a larger political aim in such efforts.
71
 
 
 67. Id. at 793 (Matheson, J., concurring) (“[W]e can employ the Salyer/Ball standard here 
to determine whether rational basis scrutiny applies to restricting the voting franchise for the 
Commission’s attorney members to licensed Kansas attorneys. We need only decide whether 
the Commission performs a limited purpose and whether it has a disproportionate effect on the 
voting population of attorneys. It does both.”). 
 68. Id. at 795 (McKay, J., dissenting). Judge McKay further dissents that “[t]he election at 
issue, like a primary election, is one step in the process of determining who will exercise one of 
the three most critical governmental functions: here, the judicial function. This election is not 
shielded from constitutional challenge simply because its role in this process is indirect.” Id. 
 69. In his recent book The Oath, written for a popular audience, Jeffrey Toobin writes: 
[T]he history of judicial selection has tracked larger themes in American history . . . . 
The politics of judicial elections changed in the 1980s. Business interests began lining 
up behind Republican candidates who promised to limit tort awards; plaintiffs’ trial 
lawyers, with fewer resources, began subsidizing Democrats. Elections, especially for 
state supreme courts, started to cost millions of dollars . . . the partisan battle lines 
were clearly drawn on the issue. Republicans supported judicial elections; Democrats 
wanted appointive systems. 
JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE OATH 211–12 (2012). 
 70. November 6, 2012 General Election: Constitutional Amendment 3, MO. SEC’Y ST., 
enr.sos.mo.gov/ENR/Views/TabularData.aspx?TabView=StateRaces^Federal/Statewide^01165
6688155 (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) [hereinafter Nov. 6, 2012 General Election]. 
 71. The possible political motivations of those initiating these referenda efforts were 
covered even in local newspapers, for example. “There’s no question that big money is being 
spent to try to influence judges. [Former Judge William Ray] Price said that from 1990 to 1999, 
$83.3 million was spent on judicial elections nationwide. That number more than doubled from 
the year 2000 to 2009.” Our View: Amendment would damage courts, JOPLIN GLOBE, Oct. 20, 
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Attacks on the constitutionality of merit-based systems may be an 
alternate route by which opponents of merit-based selection seek to 
dismantle those systems.
72
 Undoubtedly, there is a desire by moneyed 
interests to impact judicial decision-making; where non-partisan 
selection plans interfere with an ability to influence the judiciary, it is 
easy to see why they come under frequent attack.
73
 However, these 
attempts to alter merit-based selection plans through campaigns and 
referenda have generally failed.
74
 Therefore, it seems quite likely that 
attacks on such plans’ constitutionality is the new route by which 
activists hope to end merit-selection plans. Professor Nelson Lund 
attempts to undermine the constitutionality of merit-based selection 
plans by suggesting the enhanced role given to attorneys is 
unconstitutional
75—the same grounds on which the plans were 
challenged in Dool v. Burke.
76
 
As Professor Lund notes, and as noted in Part I.C, supra, there 
have been relatively few inquiries into the constitutionality of 
merit-based judicial selection plans.
77
 Lund argues that the plans are 
most amenable to attack, as in Dool v. Burke, based on structures in 
many states’ plans that allow attorneys to elect members of the 
commissions, who in turn select a given number of names to the 
executive for final selection. Because non-attorney citizens are not 
 
2012, available at http://www.joplinglobe.com/editorial/x1400188687/Our-View-Amendment-
would-damage-courts. 
 72. Former Missouri Supreme Court Judge William Ray Price defended the Plan during 
the 2012 referendum that sought to alter it. In an editorial, he wrote that “[s]adly, [political 
control] is exactly what the big contributors and special interests don’t want. They are used to 
making big contributions, to influence politicians, to get their way. They want to do that with 
judges too! The evidence is clear and shocking.” William Ray Price, Protect Our Nonpartisan 
Courts, EMISSOURIAN.COM (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.emissourian.com/opinion/letters_to_the 
_editor/article_c51b31cf-3f41-5a22-b22a-77787d55a701.html; see also TOOBIN, supra note 69, 
at 211–12. 
 73. “Judicial campaign contributions surged from $83.3 million in the period from 1990–
1999, to $206.9 million from 2000–2009 . . . . A study of 29 elections in the nation’s 10 most 
costly states showed that the top five spenders in each race contributed an average of $473,000, 
while the remaining 116,000 contributors averaged just $850 each.” Price, supra note 72. 
 74. For example, the referendum altering the Missouri Plan in Missouri failed by a huge 
margin (76 percent to 24 percent) in November of 2012. Nov. 6, 2012 General Election, supra 
note 70. 
 75. Lund, supra note 1. 
 76. Dool, 497 F. App’x at 786. 
 77. Lund, supra note 1, at 1060. 
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allowed to vote for these commission members, Lund argues, the 
plans essentially allow for disenfranchisement of non-attorney 
citizens and are barred by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
78
 Despite the relatively minor role these 
commissions play in the process of judicial selection,
79
 Lund argues 
that if elected by attorneys, they are unconstitutional.
80
 
In Lund’s view, the Kramer ruling suggests that the limited 
franchise afforded attorneys violates the Equal Protection Clause,
81
 
unless it is “‘necessary to promote a compelling state interest’ and 
‘sufficiently tailored’ to serve that interest.”82 Lund elaborates that, of 
the Court’s recognized exceptions to the principle endorsed in 
Kramer, none would allow the Court to reach a decision affirming the 
constitutionality of merit-based selection plans.
83
  
Lund even argues that the “statute struck down in Kramer 
resembles the Kansas law [in Dool v. Burke] under which candidates 
for the state supreme court are selected. If anything, the Kansas law is 
far less narrowly tailored to serve the State’s interest in restricting the 
franchise to those ‘primarily interested’ in the outcome.”84 Because 
strict scrutiny has been described by the Supreme Court as “strict in 
theory, but fatal in fact,”85 the application of either strict scrutiny or 
rational basis review ultimately determines the constitutionality of 
merit-based selection plans—or at least, all those that take advantage 
of a commission elected, at least in part, by attorneys. Lund writes, 
“Invoking the ‘one person, one vote’ equal protection decision in 
Reynolds v. Sims, the Kramer Court applied strict scrutiny. Noting 
that this case involved a complete denial of the franchise to certain 
 
 78. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 79. As noted in note 38, supra, and using the Missouri Plan as an example, attorneys elect 
a minority of members of a commission that is responsible for screening candidates and then 
submitting three names to the governor, who chooses the judge from among these submissions. 
 80. See Lund, supra note 1, at 1050. 
 81. Lund, supra note 1, at 1048–49 (“If Kramer can be distinguished, it would have to be 
on the ground that the Kansas nominating commission does not select the supreme court 
justices, but only selects the three finalists from among whom the governor must choose. To 
characterize this as a gubernatorial appointment, however, would elevate form over substance 
and leave the Kramer principle an empty, easily-evaded shell.”). 
 82. Id. at 1048. 
 83. Id. at 1050–1060. 
 84. Id. at 1049. 
 85. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989). 
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otherwise qualified voters . . . the Court held that the challenged 
statute could not be upheld.”86  
Professor Lund further argues that the narrow exceptions to 
Kramer applied in Salyer and Ball should not apply in the context of 
judicial selection.
87
 He notes that in Salyer, “the effects on different 
groups were extremely disproportionate, and the effects on the 
disenfranchised residents were extremely remote or speculative. The 
election of this type of body is hardly comparable to an election 
involving a State’s supreme court, a tribunal that has enormous 
effects on every citizen.”88 
III. ARGUMENT 
Merit-based judicial selection plans, like the Missouri Plan, are in 
use in some thirty states.
89
 Merit-based selection plans have been 
voted on repeatedly, and often enjoy overwhelming support from 
both voters and attorneys.
90
 Therefore, it is difficult to imagine that 
scholars such as Lund are truly worried about protecting the ability of 
the electorate to make their voice heard in the judicial selection 
process. Certainly, limitations on the franchise in one minor, indirect 
step in the judicial selection process—which in the federal context, of 
course, is oriented to direct appointment of judges—do not seem to 
bother the vast majority of voters asked to weigh in on 
merit-selection plans. Regardless of the true motive behind efforts to 
undermine the constitutionality of merit-based selection plans, those 
efforts should fail on the merits because of the limited function 
nonpartisan nominating commissions provide, and because of their 
purpose of promoting judicial accountability and independence.  
 
 86. Lund, supra note 1, at 1048. 
 87. Id. at 1052–53. Lund argues that the principle differences are threefold: lawyers do 
not finance the judiciary, as the landowners in Salyer did; additionally, “the Kansas nominating 
commission virtually controls the selection of officials who have broad and powerful effects on 
the general public. Finally, Kansas lawyers have a strong incentive to externalize the costs of an 
excessively lawyer friendly judiciary onto the public at large.” Id. at 1052. It is unclear what 
Lund means by a lawyer-friendly judiciary; I am unaware of any court, for example, that 
happily allows non-lawyers full privileges accorded to practicing attorneys.  
 88. Id. at 1052. 
 89. McArdle, supra note 21, at 1800. 
 90. Nov. 6, 2012 General Election, supra note 70. 
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A. An Exception to Kramer 
It is unnecessary to force the limited franchise in judicial selection 
plans into the narrow Salyer/Ball exception. Instead, Judge O’Brien’s 
opinion in Dool v. Burke finds the proper constitutional posturing of 
merit-based selection plans. He notes that “[t]he strict demands of 
[Kramer] cannot reasonably apply to every election unable to be 
wedged into the fact-bound and exceedingly narrow exception 
established in Salyer and Ball.”91 Judge O’Brien’s argument that 
“simply making an office elective does not trigger the strict demands 
of Reynolds [and, by extension, Kramer]”92 is in keeping with both 
sound constitutional interpretation and good governance. Moreover, 
the nominating commissions at issue do not exercise the type of 
general government function found to trigger the requirements of 
Kramer.
93
 
Thus, under Avery and Hadley, these nominating commissions 
should be considered for what they are: very limited bodies, more 
bureaucratic than legislative in nature, and unable to perform 
functions that might be described as general governance.
94
 Kramer is 
therefore inapplicable, and the Court should recognize a new 
exception arising out of the unique circumstances of merit-based 
judicial selection.  
Professor Lund’s contrary argument fails to acknowledge the 
recognized exceptions to Kramer. Still, it is unnecessary to classify 
merit-based selection plans under the Salyer/Ball exception to 
Kramer; the fit is an awkward one, as it is difficult to argue that the 
work of the highest state courts affects only attorneys, for example. 
Professor Lund is correct in arguing that that exception does not 
 
 91. Dool v. Burke, 497 F. App’x 782, 788 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 992 (2013) (O’Brien, J., concurring). 
 92. “[S]imply making an office elective does not trigger the strict demands of Reynolds. 
Those demands apply only when the elective office exercises the kind of general government 
functions described in Avery and its progeny.” Id. at 790 (internal citations omitted). 
 93. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
 94. In the author’s opinion, the nominating commissions in judicial selection are relatively 
powerless bureaucratic arms, lacking in real power. Unable to effectuate change in the 
government on their own, they merely serve as a filter for the ultimate exercise of power by a 
chief executive who will make a final nominating decision. Therefore, they lack the type of 
power that requires regulation under Kramer.  
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properly apply here with any force, given the obvious distinctions 
between that exception and the issue in judicial selection plans.
95
 
Judge Matheson’s opinion attempting to apply the Salyer/Ball 
exception fails to make a strong case for these commissions’ lack of 
impact, however attenuated, on the citizenry of the states. 
A strict application of Kramer in the context of judicial selection 
nominating commissions fails to appreciate the limited role of these 
bodies. Their members are not salaried and generally not staffed.
96
 
Their decisions, while indirectly meaningful to the citizenry of the 
state, have little power in themselves; and importantly, their function 
is quite far from governmental in nature. 
B. Promoting Participation 
Perhaps most crucial to this debate, however, is the aim of Kramer 
and the role of judicial selection plans like the Missouri Plan. Kramer 
and Reynolds sought to promote participation and protect democracy 
by ensuring disenfranchisement could not prevent representation. In 
their own way, merit-based selection plans do the same; by 
prohibiting the influence of moneyed interests from controlling the 
judicial selection process, they ensure at least one branch of 
government is insulated from the campaign spending that is 
increasingly detrimental to the ideas underlying cases like Kramer 
and Reynolds. Furthermore, because these plans require the governor 
to choose his or her appointees from a list generated by the 
nominating commission, merit-based selection merely provides an 
additional check on appointment power. Ultimately, this adds an 
additional layer of democracy to the typical appointment process, 
serving to increase, not decrease, political participation.
97
 
 
 95. Lund, supra note 1, at 1053–54 (“The Kansas procedure for selecting supreme court 
justices . . . obviously performs quintessentially governmental functions, and it bears no 
resemblance at all to the nominally public business enterprises at issue in Ball.”). Lund 
therefore argues that “[t]his nominating power has to be regarded as a government function, and 
subjected to strict scrutiny, for the same reason that the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to 
primary elections conducted by political parties and elections to the electoral college.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
 96. Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, YOUR MO. CTS., http://www.courts.mo.gov/page 
.jsp?id=297 (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
 97. See supra note 38. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/13
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014]  Justice Not for Sale 177 
 
 
Additionally, the public nature of the interview process increases 
transparency and participation in the judicial selection process. In 
Missouri, for example, the nominating commission interviews 
candidates who apply for a judgeship.
98
 These interviews are made 
available to the public, along with candidates’ applications.99 The 
public is then invited to comment on the potential appointees by 
directly contacting members of the nominating commission.
100
 This 
process serves only to bolster accountability and political 
participation in the nominating process—not to diminish it. 
Additionally, retention votes,
101
 in which the franchise is shared by 
all voters, add yet another layer of voter participation to the process. 
While any verdict on the fate of merit-based judicial selection 
plans must respect the Constitution, it is also vital to reject the 
schemes of moneyed interest groups eager to change judicial 
selection and to exert more influence over those elevated to the 
bench. Rejected by voters, these interests have turned to the courts, 
asking them to upend nearly a century of balanced, merit-based 
judicial selection adopted in the vast majority of states and retained 
by virtually all that have tried it. Wading into this matter would 
represent the worst form of activism by the judiciary, made all the 
worse because the policy affected is that of the courts, themselves. 
Little is more important to the integrity of the judicial system than the 
independence of judges; an attempt to infringe upon popular merit-
based plans is merely the first step in the nefarious goals of some to 
exert influence over judges. 
CONCLUSION 
While merit-based selection plans are far from perfect, they are 
not unconstitutional. Merit-based selection plans are added to state 
 
 98. Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, supra note 96.   
 99. Id. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Even opponents of merit-based selection seem to concede that retention votes grant 
the plan legitimacy; Stephen Ware, after criticizing the retention process, writes that “retention 
elections are not always toothless. On rare occasions, a judge loses one. So retention elections 
do provide some (however small) measure of democratic legitimacy.” Ware, supra note 30, at 
771. 
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constitutions through democratic processes, retain the franchise in 
almost all aspects for non-attorney voters, serve a highly limited 
function, and serve a vital purpose by seeking to check judicial 
corruption. Moreover, judicial selection is a matter of policy better 
left to the discretion of the people and their representatives—and not 
to judges themselves. The federal courts should not limit the power of 
the citizenry to choose the approach it sees fit for selecting judges, 
especially when doing so can undermine the very principles Equal 
Protection jurisprudence endeavors to protect. As Judge O’Brien of 
the Tenth Circuit noted in his concurrence in Dool v. Burke, “Kansas 
voters adopted merit selection as a middle ground between an 
appointment process scarred by abuse and an elective process 
susceptible to politicization. . . . [And] deference to democratic 
process . . . requires upholding the challenged law if we can imagine 
a conceivable justification for it.”102  
Here, that justification is crystal clear. If the United States 
Supreme Court chooses to wade into the dispute over merit-based 
selection plans, it should affirm the decision of voters in dozens of 
states to embrace a system that effectively battles corruption and 
balances the competing interests of judicial independence and 
accountability to the electorate. 
 
 102. Dool v. Burke, 497 F. App’x 782, 792 (10th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 992 (2013) (O’Brien, J., concurring). 
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